IVJilitary Order 



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COMMAXDERY OF TIIE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



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WAR PAPER 46. 



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Military ©rder of tl7e bov'al bp^ion 

OF THE 

United States. 

COMMANDEI^V OF THE DlgTl^lCT OF COLUl^BIA. 

X 

WAR PAP ERS. 
45 

PREPARED ev Companion 
Lieutenant-Colonel 

STEVENS T. NORVELL. 

U ^. Army, 
READ AT THE STATED MEETING O' JANUARY 7, 1903. 






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iU'ii i!ttr\ico in thf Cl'ivil iVav. 



The rtali expctlitions of 1S57-5S, culminated in August iif 
tile latter vear in the establishment of a military post in Cedar 
N'alley, Utah, named Camp Floyd, in honor of the then Secretary 
of War. Mere were concentrated between four and five thousand 
men of the regular Army, the post being under the command of 
Brevet Colonel Charles F. .Smith. Lieutenant-Colonel of the 
Tenth Inlantry. 

The relations existing between the Army and the Mormon 
inhabitants of the Teiritory were somewhat strained, but as the 
former svas subservient to the civil authorities, and as the latter 
never called upon it for assistance, the garrison had :miple time 
to devote to military instruction. 

It is quite probable that the United States Army never pro- 
duced an otticer better qualified for command and instructor than 
Colonel .Smith, anil under his instruction and supervision the 
command attained a perfection in everything pertaining to the 
military profession never excelled up to that time in the history 
of the Armv. Colonel Smith left his mark upon every man who 
ever served untler him. 

In 1S60 the garrison at Camp Floyd was scatteretl to the four 
winds, and this was due — so it was charged — to the secession 
element in the then existing administration, it being the policy 
of that element to so distribute the .-Vrmy as to prevent its quick 
concentration. CiuIit tin- order part i.f the S<-<-oiid Dragoons, the 



Fifth. Seventh, aiul part of the Tentli Infantry, were sent to the 
Department of New Mexico, where ah-eady were stationed the 
Mounted Rifles and part of the First Dragoons. 

The Department of New Mexico embraced that Territory, 
eastern Arizona, anil southern Colorado. The Rio Grande 
flows through New Mexico froin north to south, and the valley 
of the river contains most of the population and is the garden 
spot of the Territory. The occupied posts in the Department 
were as follows : Beginning north, on the Rio Grande, were Fort 
Garland, Albuquerque, Fort Craig, Fort Filmore, and Fort 
Bliss. The latter post being inTexas, just over the line, sometimes 
pertained to tiiat Department and sometimes to the Department 
of New Mexico, as emergencies required. In iS6i it was em- 
braced in the former. East of the Rio Grande were Fort Union, 
Fort Marcy (Santa Fi) and Fort Stanton ; west, were Fort De- 
fiance, Fort Fauntleroy, Fort Breckenridge, and Fort Buch- 
anan. The incoming troops were distributed among the posts 
named. 

The Department was supplied from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
and Kansas Citv, Missouri, and the road from the former post 
was picketed to Fort Union bv Fort Larned, Kansas, and Fort 
Wise — clianged to Fort Lvon — Colorado. In those davs New 
Mexico vvas as ilistant from Washington -as far as travel was 
concerned — as the Philippines now are. 

Political events in the winter of iS6o-'6i had but little eflect 
upon military aflairs in the Department of New Mexico. To be 
sure, secession was openh' discussed by Army officers, but the 
majority entertained the hope that the quarrel would be settled 
without resort to arms. In the meantime the building of posts 
continued, and for four months a campaign against the Navajo 
Indians was carried on, from Fort Defiance as a base, under 
Major Canbv. Tenth Infantry. Orders were issued, obeyed, and 



<luly pc-rtormcil, as llioUi;li tlicic w:is lui Mich idea as secession. 
The changes io Department Coniniaiuiers were rreqiieiit. llieie 
being lour in cigilt months, (ieneral (iaihnul, wlio had hecn in 
command lor vears. was foMowed l>y Colonel Fanntleroy, First 
Oragoons, he b_v Cohuiel Bonneville, Third Infantry, ."'nil the 
latter by Colonel W. W. Loring, Monnted RiHes. the youngest 
Colonel, ift vears, in the .Xrniy. These changes tlid not appear 
to make any ditVerence in military atVairs, for duty went on just 
the same. It is to the credit of olVicers from Southern States, 
serving in the Department of New Mexico, that but one ever 
attempted to tamper with the loyalty of the enlisted men, and he 
made a failure of it. As f;)r the enlisted nu-n, they never wavered 
in their lovalty to the Union from first to last. 

When the r.ews of the fall of Fort Sumter reached New 
Mexico, all idea of a peacefid solution of the ililliculties was 
given up, ami officers who were from Southern States made up 
their niinds to cast their lot with the South. Some resigned, 
others failetl to go through with that formality, consiilering the 
Union disrupted forever. Even those who tenderetl their resigna- 
tions did not wait for ;hc action of the authorities but left at once. 
A few took formal leave of their commanils on parade, and in 
doing so enjoined enlisted men to remain true to the ** Stars 
and Stripes." A singular proceeding, considering their own 
action ! 

Colonel Loring, commamling the l)e|)artinent, in .\pril, de- 
termined to resign. Before leaving he or<lered Major tl. K. S. 
Canby, then commanding the post at Fort Garlanil, to report at 
Headquarters of the Department at .Santa Fe Canbv was next 
in rank to Loring. The, latter did not await the arrival of the 
former in Santa F"c', but left for the South, giving out that he was 
going on an inspecting tour of the posts on the Kio Grande. 
With him went several of the Department staH'officeis. 



On assuming commnnd Canbj' found the affairs of tiie Depart- 
ment in a chaotic condition ; not onlv were officers resigning, hut 
they were leaving their posts without authority, and, in some 
instances, without otticers. Tlien it was difficult to tell whom 
to trust, for officers who ought to have remained loyal to the 
Union — judging them from their expressed sentiments — went 
South, while others, who were expected to resign remained true 
to the flag ; and still others got astride the fence and remained 
there so long that there was no telling on which side they would 
fall. Of the Department Staff", the adjutant-general, the chief 
commissary, and three paymasters resigned. 

Canby was equal to the times; a student in the art of war, a 
master in administration, and, above all. with a well balanced and 
judicial mind, he soon grasped and controlled the situation. His 
job was a hard one, requiring the genius of a soldier as well as 
that of a statesman to accomplish. Canby was well ec|uipped 
for the position he was placed in. 

The last of the Southern officers resigning had hardly got 
out of the country when rumors reached Santa Fe of a contem- 
plated invasion of New Mexico by a Confederate force from 
Texas. As a matter of fact the Territory was already threatened, 
for Fort Bliss was in the possession of Texas militia, and their 
number were being added to everv day. 

Among the first officers to resign, serving in New IVlexico, was 
Captain Henrj' H. .Sibley, of the Second Dragoons. He was a 
man of ability and had a distinguished record in the United States 
Army, dating back to the Mexican War. He conceived a scheme 
of conquering New Mexico, taking possession of Arizona, 
therebv influencing California to join the Southern Confederacy'. 
His plan was submitted to the Confederate government and was 
approved. There was no one better qualified to carry out the 
scheme than Siblev was. He had from long service a good 



knowlcd'ic of tlic top4)<;r:ipliy of the coiintrv ti) lie- ii)v:iiifcl. IK- 
knew. ;inil \\:is popular with, tlic .Moxican popiihitioii, ami lii' 
hail every reason to believe that the sympathy of the latter would 
he witii tlie cause of the Soutii on account of tiie <;eo';ra|)liical 
position of the country, the temperament of the people, and their 
iticas as to slavery. The plan was not a wild one by any means. 
There was little in common between California and the Atlantic 
Stales. The former had a mixed population, was self-supporting, 
and had no use for money other than gold. Trans-continental 
railroails were not in existence. However, before .Siblev's expe- 
dition materialized, the status of California was settled, and liirU 
State did its share for the preservation of the I nion in spite of its 
Sjold standaril. 

Canby ilccided upon a ilefensive policy. He could expect but 
little assistance from the general Government ; his main depen- 
dence would be the few regulars in his department ; and above 
all, to avoiil antasjonizing the Mexican population it was neces- 
sary that the latter should sufler as little as possil)le from the 
horrors of war. If it must suHer, let it be at tiie hands of the 
Confederates. This, in brief, was Canby's plan and policy, and 
to the entl thev remained unaltered. That he met with losses 
never contemplated was tlue to the lighting proclivities of his 
juniors, and not to any orders issued by him. 

Canby's first move to resist the invasion was to abandon every 
post west of the Rio Grande, concentrating the troops in the 
valley of the river, that being the natural route the enemy would 
take in entering the Territory. Fort Filmore, the most southern 
post, was placed in a slate of defense with a garrison consisting 
of the .Seventh Infantry and about one-half of the Moimled Rifles, 
the whole under the command of M.ijor Isaac Lynde of the former 
regiment. F"ort Stanton, about two hundred miles east of the 
Rin Grande, wan also placc<l in a state for defending with :i 



8 



ganison consisting of two companies of the Fifth Infantry and 
three troops of the Mounted RiHes, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel 
B. S. Roberts, captain of the latter legiment, commanding. 
Stanton was situated on a road — seldom used — from El Paso to 
Santa Fe ; there was also a road from the post to Albuquerque. 
At Fort Union, the depot of supplies for the Department, an 
earthwork was constructed, this post being the most important 
on account of its situation on the road to P'ort Leavenworth. 
The orders to the commanding officers of Forts Filmore and 
Stanton were to act on the defensive ; not to risk a general en- 
gageinent unless success was certain ; to hold their positions as 
long as possible anyvvav, and then to fall back — the first garrison 
to Fort Craig anil the last to Albuquerque. In other words, 
the enemy was to be delayed and harassed as much as possible. 
In the meantime, the organization of four regiments of Mexican 
Volunteers was begun. It may as well be stated now that Canby 
felt that the native regiments could not be relied on to fight the 
Confederates ; he proposed to use them against Indians if neces- 
sary, to construct fortifications, and to insure their loyalty to the 
Lfnion by feeding, clothing, and paying them. The result 
exhibited the wisdom of Canby's course. The majority of the 
educated Mexicans espoused the cause of the Union from the 
first, but these were few in number. They were commissioned 
in the Volunteers — at least, ail who were capable of service. 
The masses were indiflerent to the trouble between the North and 
South as being a matter that didn't concern them. 

Such was the state of aflairs when, in July, iS6i, a force of 
five or six hundred Texan troops, under Colonel Baylor, appeared 
at Fort Filmore and demanded its surrender. The Lfnion com- 
mander declined the demand, then withdrew the garrison and 
retreated a few miles, then changed his mind and surrendered. 
This unnecessary act caused the loss of one-third of the regular 



troops in llic ilc|);irtiiicnt. lov thcN were disni incil, |);triili'(l, ami 
alloweil to }»o to Fort Leavcnwortli until cxcliangcd. Baylor 
f()ll(>wc<l ii|) this success bv seiitliiiy; a force of aliout tliree luin- 
ilretl to capture Foit Stanton. The news ol' the approach of this 
force ami that of tlie loss of Fort Filnuire, reached Stanton at the 
same time, and the commandin<; oflicer, after destroying all the 
property that could not be carried away, abamloned the post and 
marc'ued the garrison to Albuquerque. 

The Confeilerates, satisfied with their successes, did not attempt 
anvthing more, but waite<l until the main hotly under Sibley 
arrivecl. Six months elapsed before the latter made his ajjpear- 
nnce, and the period was utilized by Canby in preparing for his 
reception. Fort Craig's garrison was strengthened to about four 
thousand men, the majority being Mexican Volunteers, and 
Canb>-, with Headquarters of the Department, here took station. 
The posts in New Mexico were reduced to four : Fort Craig. 
Albuciuer<|ue. Santa Fe, and Fort Union. The first, the most 
southetn, and the last, the most northern post, were to be 
defended ; the other two were to be abandoned, the garrisons 
retreating to Union. 

In February "Sibley's column" arriveil before Fort Craig. 
Having demanded, and been refused, the surrender of the post, 
and as Canbv would not come out and give battle, he concluded 
that he could not take the place without a protracted siege, and 
as he hatl no base of supplies, he could not aflbrd the time. He 
determined, therefore, to move up the country, thus cutting oil 
Fort Craig from the rest of Canby's command. In carrying oul 
this intention, the Confederates crossed to the east bank of the 
Rio Grande, going into camp <>n a high '-mesa" directly 
opposite the post. 

Fcbruarv 21st, the Confederates broke camp and started. 
Canby, by means of spies, was kept informed of the enemy's 



lO 



movements. The travelled road from Craig; to Albuquerque is 
on the west bank of the river to a point twenty miles below that 
town when it crosses to the east. It was necessary for Sibley to 
take this road, and to get on it his command had to march about 
tour miles to a ford. At the time the Confederates moved, a force 
of about twelve hundred regulars, two companies of Colorado 
volunteers that had just joined, and Kit Carson's regiment of New 
Mexican volunteers, the whole under the command of Brevet 
Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Roberts, left Fort Craig with orders to 
move on the west bank of the river parallel to the enemy ; to 
watch his movements; to prevent his crossing; to harass him, 
and if possible to capture and destroy his train. A good deal 
was left to Roberts' judgment, and that officer being full of fight, 
and, possibly, actuated by his disapproval of Canby's policy, 
arriving at the ford first, immediately crossed his command, but 
before he could get into position the enemy appeared and attacked 
him. The battle — known as Val Verde — raged for several hours, 
and for the numbers engaged was as severe as was ever fought. 
Finally, it was brought to an end by the capture of Roberts' 
(McRae's) battery. Canby arrived on the field at this moment; 
perceiving at once that the victory was with the Confederates, he 
ordered a retreat; and due to his care and good judgment the 
troops were withdrawn across the river and returned to Fort 
Craig. The loss on the Union side was three hundred and 
fifteen, including six officers. 

The result of the battle of Val Verde made Canbv more deter- 
mined than ever to pursue a defensive policy. Sibley, believing 
that Canby was now hermetically sealed up in Fort Craig, and that 
his surrender was only a question of a very short time, continued 
his march up the valley. He was too slow in his movements ; by 
his victory he appeared to think the country conquered ; so, instead 
of acting quickly, he consumed more than a month in marching 



II 



to Simla Fc. whicli lie coiiM liavc easily acconipllslR'il in ten days. 
Less time spent in attending balls anil other amusements would 
have enabled him ti> attack Foit Union liefore leinforcemcnts 
reached that post. In tl<e meantime, while ho was picknickinj; 
en routt\ the autiiorities in Washington, aroused liy the result of 
the battle of \'al \'erde, issued orders for the organization at Fort 
Leavenworth ol" an expedition to marcii to Canbv's relief; also 
for another in California for the snmc pm-pose. The first was to 
have been under the command of General O. .M. Mitchell, the 
latter under Colonel James IL Carleton, First Calitornia 
N'olunteers. 

The dclav in Sibley's movements enabled Canby to commimi- 
cate with Fort Union and to perfect a plan for the reception of 
the Confe<lerates. and by the time the latter arrived in .Santa Fe 
the Union troops were ready for them. The plan was as 
follows : 

At the time .Sililev left Santa Fc a force was to leave Fort 
Union. The march of the latter was to be so arranged as to meet 
the enemy in Apache Canon. The I'nion troops, giving battle, 
were to fall back slowlv toward their base, disputing everv inch 
of ground, thereby delaying the enemy as much as possible, until 
Canby, who had already left Fort Craig, came up to attack the 
enemy from the rear. 

Colonel Paul was in command at Fort Union and was to have 
commanded the troops in the field, but two days before starting 
the First Colorado Volunteers arrived at the post from Denver. 
The colonel of that regiment, Stough, was senior to P.iid, and 
he insisted upon taking command of the expedition about to 
take the field, much to Paul's disgust. 

March jSth. the .ulvance guards of the Union and Confederate 
troops met at Pidgeon's Kanche, Apache Cafion. After a sharp 
engagement the latter fell back to their main body. On the .^oth 



12 



both Armies met on the same ground, that on which the fight of 
the aSth had taken place. Here the battle of Glorietta was fought, 
and it was a magnificent fight on both sides. Stough, true to 
his orders, after the engagement had lasted about two hours, fell 
back slowly from one position to another until the eneni}' thought 
that the victory was iiis. Unfortunately, for him, Stough had, 
earlv in the morning, detached a force of about five liundred men 
under the command of Major Chivington, to pass unperceived 
by tiie enemy's right flank and attack his rear guard. This ex- 
pedition was entirely successful ; the rear guard was surprised, 
defeated, and the Confederate entire supply train destroyed. 
In tlie meantime, the fighting was going on at the front, and at 
the very moment the enemy felt certain of victory, word was 
brouoht to him of the attack in rear. Believing that Canby 
had come up and that he was now between two fires, a retreat 
was ordered, resulting in a stampede for Santa Fe. Stougii, 
satisfied with his success, bivouacked at Kosloski's Ranche, five 
miles from the battle-field, where he was joined that night by 
Chivington's command, and then, by easy marches, he returned 
to Fort Union. Having made his report to Canby, he re- 
linquished command and went to Washington to receive his 
reward. 

About the time the Confederates reached Santa Fe from their 
disaster at Apache Caiion, Sibley must have received intelligence 
of the organization of the expeditions for Canby's relief, for he 
suddenly determined to return to Texas — saving his command if 
possible. Spies reported every movement of the enemy to Canby 
and Paul, and this enaliled the Union commanders to act in 
conjunction with one another. 

Early in April, Colonel Paul, now in command at Fort 
Union, left that post with nearly the entire garrison. Rejoined 
Canby in the mountains twenty miles east of Albuquenjue, 



13 

April iitli. I'lio Cmifedcialc coliinm iVoiii S;iiil;i I'V, in riill 
rotioat >oiitli. anivcil at llic loinu'i place the same ilav. The 
next ilay tlie Confe«lerates continued their retreat to Peralto. a 
small Mexican town twenty miles helow All>iic|nerciue. Here 
ihe roail crosses to the west hank ot' the Rio (iratule. 'I'he Con- 
federates, believing that Canhy wonid dispute the ford, determinetl 
to orter hattle. aiul accordingly took position in the town — 
naturally a strong one. Canhy. on coming up. made a ilemon- 
stratioti as tlu>ugh ahout to assault, and. in fact, his troops were 
in line lor hours, momentarily expecting the command to charge. 
The commanil was never given, and at nightfall the troops were 
ordered to hivouac on the ground where thev stood. This was 
on the north siile of 'he town, the hack iloor of the latter — 
south — being open for the enemy to escape. All night long the 
Confe<leratcs could be heanl fonling the river, and hv davlight 
the town was free of them. 

And now occurred the most remaikablc event of the whole 
campaign. Here was the enemy hastening out of the country on 
the west bank of the river escorted by Canby"s army on the east 
bank. For several nights i)oth armies, with batteries in position, 
bivouacked in plain view of one another with the river between 
them. Finally, the retreat of the Confederates l)ecame a stampede, 
and as thev approached Texas thev abaniloned evervthing that 
impeded their progress, imdoubtedly thinking that Canhy had 
some deep laid scheme for their destruction. In reality, he only 
wanted them lo get out. By M.iy. with the exception of the 
wounded and sick, who could not travel, the Confederates were 
out of New Mexico, anil .Sibley's expedition was a thing of the 
past. The order for the expedition from Fort I>eavenworth 
was countermanded, but the " Calilbrnia Column," then on the 
march, was allowed to proceed, and it arrived in New Mexico 
in September, clearing Arizona of the disloyal as it advanced. 



14 

Before the end of the year everv post in the Department was 
reoccupied by U. S. troops. 

The snccessfnl conclusion of the campaign for the Union cause 
justified Canhy in the course lie pursued, but during its continu- 
ance his cross was a heavy one. While he had the respect of his. 
juniors, and their heartiest support when called upon, very few 
agreed with him in his plans. His avoidance of battle was the 
great cause of complaint, and when Roberts brought on the 
battle of Val Verde, he (lioberts) had the sympathy and support 
of all under his command. It was not until the campaign was 
over that Canity's wisdom was fullv appreciated. 

Canby saved New Mexico to the Union, and bv his statesman- 
ship made the ^Mexican population loval — at the beginning a 
doubtful problem. 

In conclusion, a few words about General Canliy may not be 
inappropriate. 

On graduating at West Point he was assigned to the Second 
Infantry. He was brevetted several times for distinguished 
services and gallantry in the war with Mexico ; was an Assistant 
Adjutant-General when, in 18^5, the Army was increased bv two 
regiments of cavalry and two of infantry, he being ajjpointed a 
major in the latter and to fill an original vacancy. In 1S61 he 
was appointed Colonel of the Nineteenth Infantry, and his appoint- 
ment of Brigadier-General of Volunteers followed. Before the 
end of the war he was a Major-General of Volunteers, and at its 
conclusion, a Brigadier-General in the regular Army. 

General Canby was pure in life, religious and charitable, with- 
out making a parade of either. He had unlimited confidence in 
himself; seldom sought advice; was not afraid of responsibility, 
and assumed it when he could properly have placed it upon 
others, particularly his juniors. He never exhibited temper, 
never uttered a complaint, and bore all his trials and tribulations 



15 

in .1 perfectly pLiciil inanncr. Ills vviitcliwurd wais liulv. ami no 
thought ol" personal aggramli/.enient ever swerved him from the 
line he had marked out. 

Honors came to General Canhy imsought lor, his advanciiuLiil 
in rank heing due to genuine merit. It is sad to think that the 
life of such a man should have hecn brought to a close hy the act 
of one who belonged to the verv scum of the earth. 



